My Morning Papers
We call for unity of effort in five areas, beginning with unity of effort on the challenge of counterterrorism itself:
--Unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center; unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director;
--Unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries;
--Unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and accountability;
--Strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.
------UNITY OF EFFORT: A NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
The 9/11 story teaches the value of integrating strategic intelligence from all sources into joint operational planning with both dimensions spanning the foreign-domestic divide.
--In some ways, since 9/11, joint work has gotten better. The effort of fighting terrorism has flooded over many of the usual agency boundaries because of its sheer quantity and energy. Attitudes have changed. But the problems of coordination have multiplied. The Defense Department alone has three unified commands (SOCOM, CENTCOM, and NORTHCOM) that deal with terrorism as one of their principal concerns.
--Much of the public commentary about the 9/11 attacks has focused on "lost opportunities." Though characterized as problems of "watch listing," "information sharing," or "connecting the dots," each of these labels is too narrow. They describe the symptoms, not the disease.
--Breaking the older mold of organization stove piped purely in executive agencies, we propose a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) that would borrow the joint, unified command concept adopted in the 1980s by the American military in a civilian agency, combining the joint intelligence function alongside the operations work.
--The NCTC would build on the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center and would replace it and other terrorism "fusion centers" within the government.
--The NCTC would become the authoritative knowledge bank, bringing information to bear on common plans. It should task collection requirements both inside and outside the United States. The NCTC should perform joint operational planning, assigning lead responsibilities to existing agencies and letting them direct the actual execution of the plans.
--Placed in the Executive Office of the President, headed by a Senate-confirmed official (with rank equal to the deputy head of a cabinet department) who reports to the National Intelligence Director, the NCTC would track implementation of plans. It would be able to influence the leadership and the budgets of the counterterrorism operating arms of the CIA, the FBI, and the departments of Defense and Homeland Security.
--The NCTC should not be a policymaking body. Its operations and planning should follow the policy direction of the president and the National Security Council.
UNITY OF EFFORT: A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR
Since long before 9/11 and continuing to this day the intelligence community is not organized well for joint intelligence work. It does not employ common standards and practices in reporting intelligence or in training experts overseas and at home. The expensive national capabilities for collecting intelligence have divided management. The structures are too complex and too secret.
--The community's head -- the Director of Central Intelligence -- has at least three jobs: running the CIA, coordinating a 15-agency confederation, and being the intelligence analyst-in-chief to the president. No one person can do all these things.
--A new National Intelligence Director should be established with two main jobs: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers that combine experts from all the collection disciplines against common targets like counterterrorism or nuclear proliferation; and (2) to oversee the agencies that contribute to the national intelligence program, a task that includes setting common standards for personnel and information technology.
--The national intelligence centers would be the unified commands of the intelligence world -- a long-overdue reform for intelligence comparable to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols law that reformed the organization of national defense. The home services -- such as the CIA, DIA, NSA, and FBI -- would organize, train, and equip the best intelligence professionals in the world, and would handle the execution of intelligence operations in the field.
--This National Intelligence Director (NID) should be located in the Executive Office of the President and report directly to the president, yet is confirmed by the Senate. In addition to overseeing the National Counterterrorism Center described above (which will include both the national intelligence center for terrorism and the joint operations planning effort), the NID should have three deputies:
--For foreign intelligence (a deputy who also would be the head of the CIA)
--For defense intelligence (also the under secretary of defense for intelligence)
--For homeland intelligence (also the executive assistant director for intelligence at the FBI or the under secretary of homeland security for information analysis and infrastructure protection)
--The NID should receive a public appropriation for national intelligence, should have authority to hire and fire his or her intelligence deputies, and should be able to set common personnel and information technology policies across the intelligence community.
--The CIA should concentrate on strengthening the collection capabilities of its clandestine service and the talents of its analysts, building pride in its core expertise.
--Secrecy stifles oversight, accountability, and information sharing. Unfortunately, all the current organizational incentives encourage over classification. This balance should change; and as a start, open information should be provided about the overall size of agency intelligence budgets.
